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The Conclusion That a Sinister Conspiracy
of Foreign Origin Controls Organized Crime:
The Influence of Nativism in the Kefauver
Committee Investigation
DAVID

R. WADE*

INTRODUCTION

The Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate
Commerce,' chaired by first-term Democratic Senator from Tennessee,
Estes Kefauver, began its work on May 10, 1950 and concluded with the
submission of its final report on May 1, 1951.2 The function of the
Committee was to fully study the extent to which organized crime makes
use of the facilities of interstate commerce; to identify those persons, groups,
firms, or corporations involved in such organized criminal activity; and
determine the extent to which such organized criminal activity acts as a
corrupting influence.3 The Committee held hearings in fourteen cities4 and
* B.S., Grinnell College; M.A., Duquesne University; J.D., University of Iowa;
Associate Professor of Business Administration, Northern Illinois University. The author
would like to thank Patrick L. Edgerton for his thoughtful research assistance and his helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
1. Introduced by Senator Estes Kefauver on January 5, 1950, but created on May 3,
1950, pursuant to S. Res. 202, 81st Cong. 1st Sess., 96 CONG. REC. 6225-6246 (1950) and
later extended to May 1, 1951 by S. Res. 60 and further extended to September 1, 1951 by
S. Res. 129.
2. THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED
CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951),
microformed on U.S. Serial Set. No. 11491, Vol. 6, Report 307 [hereinafter THIRD REPORT].
The THIRD REPORT evidences the Special Committee's findings under Senator Kefauver's
chairmanship (the "Kefauver Committee") concluding May 1, 1951. The Special Committee
continued its investigation with Senator Herbert O'Conor as the chair and its conclusions
were submitted in the final report on August 31, 1951. FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITrEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. NO.
725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1951), microformed on U.S. Serial Set. No. 11491, Vol. 6,
Report 725 [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].

The O'Conor Committee, in the Final Report,

adopted all the findings and recommendations of the Kefauver Committee in addition to
some of their own. See id. at 6-13 (providing the recommendations and suggestions).
3. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.
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heard testimony from more than six hundred witnesses, including federal,
5
state, and local officials, as well as suspected and convicted criminals.
The Kefauver Committee, in its final report, reached seventeen
conclusions 6 and offered twenty-two recommendations for remedial action 7
by Congress. One such conclusion will be the focus of this paper. The
Committee concluded (in part):
There is a sinister criminal organization known as the Mafia
operating throughout the country with ties in other nations ....
The Mafia is the direct descendant of a criminal organization of
the s'ame name originating in [sic] the island of Sicily .... The
Mafia is the binder which ties together the two major criminal
syndicates as well as numerous other criminal groups throughout
the country. The power of the Mafia is based on a ruthless
enforcement of its edicts and its own law of vengeance .... '
Flowing from this conclusion was the Committee's recommendation that:
The immigration laws should be amended to facilitate
deportation of criminal and other undesirable aliens....
The Immigration Act ... should be amended to provide
punishment for smuggling, concealing, or harboring aliens not
entitled by law to enter or reside in the United States....
4. The cities included Washington, D.C.; Tampa, Fla; Miami, Fla.; New York City;
Cleveland, Ohio; St. Louis, Mo.; Kansas City, Mo.; New Orleans, La.; Chicago, Ill.; Detroit,
Mich.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Las Vegas, Nev.; Los Angeles, Ca.; and San Francisco, Ca. See
THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 21.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1-5.
7. See id. at 5-20.
8. Id. at 2. The Committee, in an earlier Report concluded that, "if there can be said
to be one head who sits as an arbiter of any disputes between the two, it is Charles 'Lucky'
Luciano, who is now in Italy .... " SECOND INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1951), microformed on U.S. Serial Set. No. 11491, Vol. 6, Report 141
[hereinafter SECOND REPORT].
Kefauver reiterated this foreign conspiracy theory in Crime In America, his
personally penned, self-aggrandizing follow-up to the Committee's work. Kefauver wrote:
A nationwide crime syndicate does exist in the United States of America
... a loosely organized but cohesive coalition of autonomous crime
'locals'....
Behind the local mobs which make up the national crime syndicate is a
shadowy, international criminal organization known as the Mafia, so
fantastic that most Americans find it hard to believe it really exists.

ESTES KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA 12-14 (1951).
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The Attorney General should be authorized to revoke
suspensions of deportation and to make such revocation ground
for the cancellation of certificates of naturalization granted aliens
who have succeeded in getting their immigration status recognized .....
Other than those involving immigration, the Committee's recommendations
de-emphasized federal involvement in favor of stepped-up state, local, and
civilian action.' 0
The significance of the Kefauver Committee's conclusion that a sinister
conspiracy of foreign origin controls organized crime and its remedial
recommendations emphasizing state, local, and civilian action is three-fold.
First, the Committee placed the state imprimatur on a view of organized
crime as imported and foreign-based, thus acting out a nativist" passion
play of Us against Them-the "pure" Anglo-American versus the "tainted"
immigrant.
Second, the Committee represented the first national investigation of
organized crime. Prior to 1950, organized crime investigations were state,
local, and, in some cases, civilian.' 2 Since 1951, federal involvement in
the investigation and prosecution of organized crime has not followed the
recommendations of the Committee, which emphasized stiffer immigration

9. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.
10. See id. at 7-20; see also infra notes 127-133 and accompanying text (supporting
the assertion that the Committee de-emphasized federal and emphasized local and state
action). The Committee conceived of the federal role as one of oversight, coordination and
a clearinghouse with no specific enabling statutes nor enforcement powers. Recommendations included: a Justice Department racket squad, the creation of a Federal Crime
Commission to study criminal organizations but without subpoena power, a Special Fraud
Squad within the Treasury Department to collect taxes from suspected criminals, and minor
tweaking of the IRS laws. Id. at 7-11.
11. "Nativism" is defined as "intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground
of its foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections[,] ... [which] translates ... into a zeal to
destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life." JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS
IN THE LAND 4 (1955).
12. See MOORE, infra note 59, at 2.
A history of decentralized government as well as the perennial conviction
that crime was a local problem best handled by local authorities dictated
the concentration of law enforcement duties in the lower levels of
government ....
[Tihe federal government assumed no important law
enforcement functions. The ultimate responsibilities remained with the
state governments which, in turn, passed along most of the duties to county
and city officials.
Id. at 2.
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laws' 3 and greater state, local, and civilian action.' 4 Instead, scrutiny of
organized crime has evolved into a domain characterized by federal
domination.' 5 I will argue that the Committee's recommendations, while
flowing naturally from a nativist conclusion of a sinister conspiracy of
foreign origin, unwittingly served the expansionist interests of federal law
enforcement.
Third, the Committee's hearings were the first congressional committee
hearings televised live to a national audience.' 6 The era of televised
politics was kicked off by the Committee's investigations and its participants
were among the first exposed to the glare of the klieg lights. I will argue

13. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 15 (suggesting amendment to immigration laws
to: facilitate deportation of criminal and other undesirable aliens; and to provide punishment
for smuggling, concealing, or harboring illegal aliens).
14. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6. "The enforcement of the criminal law is
primarily a State and local responsibility." id. at 5. "The responsibility is basically one that
must be shared by local and State agencies of law enforcement, as well as by the citizens of
the various communities who tolerated such conditions. Nor can a remedy for these
conditions be found merely by shrugging off local and state responsibility .... " Id. at 6.
"The Federal Government can never be a satisfactory substitute for local self-government in
the enforcement field." Id. at 6 (quoting J. Edgar Hoover).
15. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 952 (1970) (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. §§ 841-48 (1994) (chapter heading entitled "Importation, Manufacture, Distribution
and Storage of Explosive Materials"); Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 936 (1970) (codified as
amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511, 1955 (1994)); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.),
which includes: Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1994) (chapter heading entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations")); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See also Ch. 645, 62 Stat.
749 (1948) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-34 (1994) (chapter heading entitled
"Fraud and False Statements")); Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 755 (1948) (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. §§ 1071-74 (1994) (chapter heading entitled "Fugitives From Justice")); Ch. 645, 62
Stat. 760 (1948) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1201-04 (1994) (chapter heading
entitled "Kidnapping")); Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 793 (1948) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§
1951-60 (1994) (chapter heading entitled "Racketeering")); Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 805 (1948)
(codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-22 (1994) (making it a federal crime to traffick
in interstate commerce the following "Stolen Property": stolen vehicles, goods, securities,
moneys, tax stamps, livestock, videos, copyright, etc.)); Crimes and Criminal Procedure, ch.
645, 62 Stat. 683 (1948) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) and
includes: Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 812 (1948) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1994)
(chapter heading entitled "Transportation For Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes"));
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994) (codified in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.).
16. See MOORE, infra note 59, at 183-86 (discussing the decision to have "live"
hearings and its impact).
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that television's presence had a powerful and multi-faceted influence on the
Committee's work and significantly contributed to the Committee's
subsequent conclusion that a sinister conspiracy of foreign origin controls
organized crime. Television provided the Committee an unexpected
intimacy with its American audience in their living rooms. This intimacy
formed a rich soil in which to plant and cultivate the Committee's nativist
view of organized crime as an imported conspiracy and provided a ready
market for their harvest of nativist recommendations.
Through the course of this paper, I will examine the influence of
nativism in the Committee's investigation, conclusions, and recommendations. In the second section, I will examine nativism as a sociological
concept by tracing its historical significance in American culture. In the
third section, I will explore nativism as it informs competing theories of
organized crime, aiding and abetting an acceptance of a foreign conspiracy
model over a model emphasizing organized crime as a homegrown response
to indigenous social and economic conditions. In the fourth section, I will
first examine the influence of nativism in the Committee's investigative
hearings, second in their recommendations, and finally in their use of
television to incite nativist urges and spread nativist sentiment.
I. NATIviSM GENERALLY

John Higham, in his classic Strangers in the Land, defined nativism as
the belief that "some influence originating abroad threaten[s] the very life
of the nation from within." 7 Nativism is often expressed as "intense
opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., "unAmerican") connections[,] [which] translates ...

into a zeal to destroy the

enemies of a distinctively American way of life."" One should be careful
not to equate racism with nativism. For the purposes of this paper, race is
not as central to the concept of nativism as national origin 9 except insofar
as some earlier scholars and scientists endorsed a racial taxonomy associated
with geographical origin.2" Therefore, while racism is a variation of

17. See HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 4.

18. Id.at 4.
19. It is not necessary to rationalize resentment and hostility towards foreigners
through racism. Racism requires not only a perception of difference and an assumption of
superiority. Racism requires that the difference and the rationalization for the assumption
be rooted in biology not in culture. Indeed, racism presumes that assimilation of races is

impossible not simply undesirable. See JOSIAH NoTr & GEORGE GLIDDON, TYPES OF
MANKIND (1855). Nativism, while it can assume racist incarnations, more frequently blames

immigrants' failure to assimilate on religious or cultural stubbornness, not on biology.
20. For example, in 1735, Carolus Linnaeus in his Systemae Naturae divided humans
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nativism, the focus of this paper will be on "native" American animosity
toward "foreign" immigration, specifically Italian-Americans.
Nativism did not originate with the Kefauver Committee. Suspicion of
foreign-based conspiracies was not a new phenomenon in the 1950s, nor
was a call for restrictive immigration laws. Nativist sentiment waxed and
waned throughout American history persisting even into the present day. 2'

into four groups: Homo Europaeus, Homo Asiaticus, Homo Africanus, and Homo
Americanus. Similarly, a generation later Georges-Louis Leclerc Buffon established seven
categories of man: Laplanders, Mongolians, Southern Asiatics, Europeans, Ethiopeans, and
Malays. See DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM 123 (1995). These scholars believed
in the simultaneous creation of all races of humans and attributed differences to variations
in climate, diet, and circumstance. Id. at 124.
21. For example, in 1992 California voters approved Proposition 187 which denies
assistance and education to illegal immigrants. Proposition 187 was subsequently codified
at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215, 66010.8 (Deering 1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.65
(Deering Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (Deering 1995); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 113-14, 834(b) (Deering 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (Deering
Supp. 1995).
Proposition 187 exemplifies nativist sentiment in that it isolates and identifies
immigrants as an imminent threat to the economic solvency of the state of California. Illegal
immigration in California is viewed as a corrupting, destructive threat to a welfare system
designed to benefit Americans and much of the rhetoric surrounding it is of a blaming
variety. Welfare induces illegal immigration which saps the economic resources of the State
and also denies legal residents employment in those positions pre-empted by illegals. Much
of the rhetoric supporting the measure was infused with the common nativist sentiment of
immigrants corrupting the values of the modern American welfare state. See James E. Garcia,
Kemp, Bennett Unlikely Allies with Proposition 187 Opponents, AUSTIN-AMERICAN
STATEMAN, Nov. 20, 1994, at El; Georgie A. Geyer, Voters Reject Guilt Campaign and
Approve Proposition 187, DENVER POST, November 13, 1994, at F6; Joseph M. Rivas, Can
They Come In? MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 1995, at Al; Gebe Martinez,
California Elections / Proposition 187 Kemp Defends Criticism Before Hostile Audience,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1994, at A3; Ruben Martinez, Behold Legacy of Anti-Immigrant Wave,
One Year After Proposition 187, California'sUndocumented Speak Softly but Carry a Big
Mop, STAR TRIB., Oct. 23, 1995, at 9A.
In 1990 and 1994, Pat Buchanan mounted viable runs for the Presidency by
appealing to nativist sympathies by seeking stricter immigration policies and protectionist
tariffs and quotas. See Michael Barone, The American IsolationistMirage, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 3, 1992, at 29; Robert L. Bartley, Mugwumps Battle Know-Nothings for
GOP's Future, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at A18; Charles Krauthammer, Do We Really
Need a New Enemy?, TIME, March 23, 1992, at 76; Christopher Ogden, PresidentBuchanan
and the World: The Hot Candidate'sIsolationism is Better Suited to the 19th Century Than
to the 21st, TIME INT'L, Mar. 4, 1996, at 26; Clarence Page, Voices for the Voiceless?;
Mirror Inages From 2 Different Political Poles, CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1996, § 1, at 19;
Indeed a new immigration act is proceeding through the legislative process having
passed the House of Representatives on its way to the Senate. See H.R. 2022, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1996) (referred to as The Immigration Act of 1995, an amendment to the
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The Alien and Sedition Acts 22 were an eighteenth century legislative23

response to a perceived threat of foreign radicalism and native dissent.
The anti-Catholic "Know-Nothing Party" of the mid-eighteenth century
traded on nativist sentiment and called for restrictive immigration laws and
supported keeping the foreign-born out of political office. 24 Nativist
sentiment reached near hysterical proportions following the Haymarket Riot
of 1866 during which anarchists, predominantly immigrants, called a
peaceful meeting. The Chicago police attempted to break it up and a bomb
exploded in the midst of the police. 25 Foreign-bred imported anarchy
became the salient fear of the day and the image of the immigrant as lawless
and violent became the preferred stereotype. The call for restrictive
immigration laws was sounded loud and clear.26 John Higham contends
that "[n]ativism, as a significant force in modern America, dates from that
labor upheaval. 2 7
While nativism's significance may have its genesis in the mideighteenth century, it would exert its pernicious power from 1880 to 1930.
During this period, a second wave of immigration swept in from Europe.
While "old" immigrants were primarily British, Irish, German, and
Scandinavian: "new" immigrants were Italians, Jews, and Slavs.2 8 Further

Immigration in the National Interest Act). See also Dave McCurdy, The Future of U.S.
Immigration Law, 20 J. LEGIS. 3 (1994) (discussing the future of immigration and stating that
"some sixty-five percent of Americans now favor tighter immigration laws.")
22. Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Act of June 18, 1798, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed), Act
of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570 (expired); Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 277 (expired), Act of
July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (expired). See JAMES M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956)

enforcement, and impact of the Alien and Sedition laws).
23. HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 8.

(discussing the history,

24. See id. at 6-7; MILTON GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE 93-94 (1964).

The term "Know-Nothings" is attributed to New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley and
described a nativist, anti-Catholic organization that developed national strength particularly
in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Kentucky. See ELLIS COSE, A
NATION OF STRANGERS: PREJUDICE, POLITICS AND THE POPULATING OF AMERICA 33 (1952).

25. See Stephan Landsman, When Justice Fails, 84 MICH. LAW. REV. 824 (1986)

(reviewing PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY (1984)); JOHN S. KEBABIAN, THE
1886 HAYMARKET AFFAIR AND THE TRIAL OF THE CHICAGO ANARCHISTS (1970) (containing
original manuscripts, letters, articles, and printed material of the anarchists and of the state
prosecutor); HENRY DAVID, THE HISTORY OF THE HAYMARKET AFFAIR (1936, 1958, 1965).
26. See HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 54-55; GORDON, supra note 24, at 96-97.
27. HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 53 (eruption of strikes and mass boycotts around 1886).
28. See GORDON, supra note 24, at 96-99. Between 1820 and 1870, only 26,000

Italians came to the United States; by 1900 that number had increased by more than a
million. Russian emigration went from 4000 to three quarters of a million. From Poland,
during the same period, immigration rose from 4000 to 160,000. See ELLIS COSE, supra note
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complicating matters, this second wave was enormous compared to the
first. 29 By 1920, half of the United States population was foreign-born or
second-generation immigrant. In the cases of the Portuguese, Italians,
Lithuanians, and Poles, only about half were literate.3"
American workers feared that cheap immigrant labor jeopardized their
demands for higher wages and better working conditions. Workers were not
alone in their concern over this "new" immigration. Industrialists and
industrial organizations joined the nativist cacophony.
In 1886, the
American Iron and Steel Association held the position that: "It is impossible
to deal intelligently and thoroughly with the labor question without dealing
with the immigration question.'
In 1894, this same group went even
further, contending that the depression of the 1890s was fueled by "the
presence among us of thousands of idle and vicious foreigners who have not
come here to work for a living but to stir up strife and to commit crime."32
An educator writing in 1909 commented:
These southern and eastern Europeans are of a very different type
...not possessing the Anglo-Teutonic conceptions of law, order,
and government, their coming has served to dilute tremendously
our national stock, and to corrupt our civic life .... Our task is to
break up these groups ... to assimilate ... these people as a part
of our American race; and to implant in their children ...the
Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law and order, and
popular government, and to awaken in them a reverence for our
democratic institutions and for those things in our national life
which we as a people hold to be of abiding worth.33
Francis Walker, head of the American Economic Association, described
immigrants as "beaten men from beaten races, representing the worst failures

24, at 60; see also

GEORGE J. BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF
IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 6 (1990) (providing a summary of immigration patterns

and the impact on the American economy up through the 1980s).
29. Before 1820, about ten thousand persons per year entered the United States.
Between 1840 and 1880, approximately eight million immigrants entered. Between 1880 and
1930, immigration exploded with 25 million immigrants seeking a new life in America. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, IMMIGRATION: 1820 TO 1991, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 10 (1993).

30. See RICHARD EASTERLIN ET AL., IMMIGRATION 8-9 (1982).
31. HIGHAM, supra note Il,at 51.
32. Id. at 70.
33. GORDON, supra note 24, at 98 (citing CUBBERLY, CHANGING CONCEPTION OF
EDICTION (1909)). See generally JOSIAH STRONG, OUR COUNTRY, (Jurgen Herbst ed.,
Harvard University Press 1963) (1891) (arguing that nonwhite immigrants were corrupting
Anglo-Saxon civilizational virtues).
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in the struggle for existence. '"' Near the turn of the century, nativism was
at a fever pitch.35 One Oxford historian suggested, "[t]he best remedy for
would be if every Irishman should kill a
whatever is amiss in America
36
Negro and be hanged for it."
The 1890s saw the creation and development of a number of nativist
organizations campaigning for patriotism and the teaching of the English
These groups also supported restrictions on immigration,
language.
including mandatory literacy tests. The most tangible result of this late
nineteenth century upsurge of nativism was the Immigration Act of 1891.38
This statute placed immigration wholly under federal administrative
authority and prescribed means of enforcement which compelled steamship
companies to return those immigrants entering illegally or any alien who
became a public charge "from causes existing prior to his landing. .... 39
The Act also denied admission to those immigrants encouraged by employer
advertising and those aliens immigrating as a result of contracts for labor
negotiated with U.S. employers.4"
During the late nineteenth century, anti-foreign sentiment directed at
Italians traded on the stereotype which the Kefauver Committee was later
to confirm. Italians were stiletto-wielding, vendetta-motivated purveyors of
impassioned violence. This anti-Italian strain of nativism erupted in its most
34. D'SOUZA, supra note 20, at 137 (citing Francis Walker, The Tide of Economic

Thought, 6

PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

37 (Jan.-Mar. 1891).

35. See generally STRONG, supra note 33.
36. BARRY N. SCHWARTZ AND ROBERT DISCH, WHITE RACISM 58 (1970) (citing
Edward A. Freeman, an Oxford historian, lecturing in America, voicing his solution for
American minority group problems).
37. Most notable of these groups was the American Protective Association formed in
1887 in Clinton, Iowa. This group did not reach real power until 1917 when, with the
Justice Departrhent's approval, they aided the government agencies in the accumulation of
information concerning possible disloyalty during World War 1. Membership was largely
professional and business men and peaked at 250,000. Other groups included the Grand
Army of the Republic composed of Civil War veterans; the United Order of Native
Americans; the American Patriotic League; the Get There American Benefit Association; the
Loyal Men of American Liberty; the Sons of the American Revolution; and the Daughters
of the American Revolution. See generally HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 35-68. The American
Association of Foreign Language Newspapers founded and funded by T. Coleman du Pont
and other leading industrialists of the age, acquired 400 foreign-language newspapers in order
to promote "Americanism." See GERARD COLBY ZILG, Du PONT: BEHIND THE NYLON
CURTAIN 168-69 (1974) (it appears the foreign newspapers were used as a propaganda for
the immigrants who could only read those newspapers and the newspapers "constantly tiraded
against socialism and everything else un-American").
38. Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
39. Id. at 1086.
40. Id. at 1084.
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vicious and virulent incarnation in New Orleans following the murder of
New Orleans Superintendent of Police David Hennessey in 1890."'
Nineteen Italian immigrants were indicted and arraigned.4 2 Eventually all
were acquitted of the crime or the charges against them were dismissed.43
The public was outraged and the morning after the trial, a mob marched on
the jail, shot nine of the eleven defendants still held there, and hung the
other two. 44
Nativism continued into the twentieth century and reached another peak
in another "Americanization" movement before and during World War 1.4,
Theodore Roosevelt was a strong supporter declaring, "[t]here is no room
in this country for hyphenated Americanism. [A] hyphenated American is
not an American at all., 46 This movement endeavored to strip the immigrant of his native culture and make him over into an American AngloSaxon. 47 Assuring the political loyalty of the foreigner was of the greatest
concern during these war years.48
[B]y threat and rhetoric 100 per cent Americanizers opened a
frontal assault on foreign influence in American life. They set
about to stampede immigrants into citizenship, into adoption of
41. HORAN, infra note 44, at 420-21.
42. Id. at 221; Coxe, infra note 44, at 1079. Although nineteen were indicted and
arraigned, over one-hundred Italian immigrants were arrested. Id. at 1070.
43. Coxe, infra note 44, at 1085, 1088.
44. John Coxe, The New Orleans Mafia Incident, 20 LA. HIST. Q., 1067, 1088 (1937).
For a sampling of the literature on the "mafia incident," see also ALBANESE, infra note 59,
at 15-17; James Horan, THE PINKERTONS: THE DETECTIVE DYNASTY THAT MADE HISTORY
419-46 (1967); (1937); J. Alexander Karlin, The New Orleans Lynchings of 1891 and the
American Press, 24 LA. HIST. Q., 187 (1941); John S. Kendall, Who Killa De Chief, 22 LA.
HIST. Q., 492 (1939).
45. For example, the Boy Scouts of America were formed by a group of industrialists,
led by Coleman du Pont and including such leading corporate figures as John D. Rockefeller,
J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and George Pratt. Vigilance against anti-Americanism was
inspired by the Boy Scout motto, "Be Prepared." Early Scout law mandated loyalty "to the
President, and to his officers, and to his parents, his country, and his employer." ZILG, supra
note 37, at 169.
46. Cited in REED UEDA, POSTWAR IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY 124
(1994).
47. Id. at 98 (asserting that social and occupational mobility was dependent on
linguistic assimilation, depriving illiterate immigrants of resources of the surrounding
culture).
48. The Du Pont Corporation hired a 1,400-man private police force to prevent foreign
sabotage during the war by spying on workers. "[A]nyone who expressed dissent with the
war or dissatisfaction with Du Pont wages or conditions risked being branded a German spy,
Russian Communist, or some other 'foreign' brand of 'inhumanity."' ZILG, supra note 37,
at 163.
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the English language, and into an unquestioning reverence for
existing American institutions. They bade them abandon entirely
their Old World loyalties, customs and memories. They used
They cajoled and they
high-pressure, steam-roller tactics.
commanded.4 9
This "Americanization" movement, seeking rapid assimilation, faded by
the 1920s. The melting pot nativists gave way to the racist nativists. Racist
nativists denounced assimilation, finding inferior groups congenitally
deficient. Assimilation would only adulterate and corrupt the Anglo-Saxon
race. Madison Grant, praised Nordic civilization but warned of its vitiation
by inferior Alpine and Mediterranean strains.50 Eugenics, a movement
endorsing selective breeding and selective sterilization, grew in popularity.5 ' Eugenic societies sprang up.52 In Buck v. Bell,53 the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the involuntary sterilization of a young woman. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote, "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."54
Racist nativists' solution was to barricade the borders and deport the
unusable evil already here.55
Many of the goals of restrictive immigration were achieved in a series
of legislative acts beginning in 1921 and ending with the national origins
formula which became effective in 1924.6 The pattern of nativism
49. HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 247.
50. See generally MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1916).
51. The chief architect of Social Darwinism, Herbert Spencer, attributed poverty,
pauperism, crime, and other social ills on heredity rather than social conditions. See generally
HERBERT SPENCER, FIRST PRINCIPLES (1902). Human rights were futile attempts to regulate
the harsh evolutionary doctrine of "survival of the fittest." Eugenics represented a systematic
program to ensure the survival of the fittest in America. People would be identified as unfit
and would be discouraged from having children, perhaps through sterilization, perhaps
involuntarily. Conversely, those designated as fit would be encouraged to breed for the well
being of the country.
52. These included the National Conference on Race Betterment, the Eugenics Record
Office, and the American Breeders Association. Members of the latter organization included
David Jordan, President of Stanford University; Charles Henderson, a sociologist at the
University of Chicago; and geneticist Charles Davenport. See D'SOUZA, supra note 20, at
141.
53. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding it is within the power of a State to provide for sexual
sterilization of inmates found to be afflicted with an hereditary form of insanity or
imbecility).
54. Id. at 207. The Court was referring to the defendant who was a feeble minded
women herself and the daughter of a feeble minded women and the mother of a feeble
minded child. Id. at 205.
55. HIGHAM, supra note I1, at 136-44.
56. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1924, Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). These acts
placed a quota on immigrants and created quotas for each country based on an estimate of
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continued with the wholesale internment of Japanese and JapaneseAmericans during World War ll." Fears of foreign-directed espionage
headed the list of anticipated catastrophes resulting from inaction against
domestic foreigners.
Nativism continued into the early fifties and found its expression in the
Kefauver Committee hearings in 1950-51 and later assumed an even more
virulent form in the McCarthy Committee hearings of 1951-52.58 During
this period, organized crime and domestic communism were identified as
imported and foreign-controlled. What is notable is that neither organized
crime nor communism represented a natural, homegrown, rational, economic
response to the oppressive, hierarchical, Anglo-Saxon capitalism which had
denied the "new" immigrant entrance and acceptance into mainstream
American life. Our system and society were not to blame. Organized
criminals and communists represented potent foreign threats to the American
way of life.

II. NATIVISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL MODELS OF ORGANIZED CRIME
Numerous authors have advanced the argument that the primary reason
for criminal syndicates is the desire of private citizens for the illicit goods
and services the criminal syndicate is ready, willing, and able to provide.59
Persistent public demand requires a syndicated structure to supply it. Such
a structure generally involves collusion between criminals, police, and
politicians, but it is the public demand for illicit goods and services which
forms the structure's foundation. "The widespread acceptance of a belief in

their relative contributions to the national origins of the white American population.
Specifically, the government restricted annual nationality totals to two percent of the size of
each group as counted in the U.S. Census of 1890. 43 Stat. at 159. Thus, English, Irish,
German, and Scandinavians were favored over later arrivals from Italy, Austria, Russia, and
Poland. See STANLEY LIBERSON, A PIECE OF THE PIE: BLACK AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS
SINCE 1880, at 29 (1980). There was a split of opinion among industrialists of the time.
Some, like Coleman du Pont, sought cheap labor and opposed restrictive immigration in
favor of "americanization" of an endless unchecked stream. See ZILG, supra note 37, at 19294. Others, concerned with rising unemployment, favored restrictions, particularly ones
favoring established proportions. Id. at 194-95.
57. See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983) (telling the story of the
Supreme Court's upholding of the military orders that forced more than 110,000 Americans
of Japanese ancestry from their homes into ten internment camps).
58. See infra note 157.

59. See JOSEPH
H.

L. ALBINI, AMERICAN MAFIA: GENESIS OF A LEGEND

(1971). See also

1950-52
(1974); JAY S. ALBANESE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA, (1985); Daniel Bell, Crime as
an American Way of Life, 13 ANTIOCH REV. 131 (1953).
WILLIAM
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the existence of a 'Mafia' . . . that is blamed for importing syndicated
organized crime ... serves to divert attention away from the fact that it is
the American public that keeps syndicates in business." ' The Kefauver
Committee conclusion regarding the Mafia served precisely this purpose and
adhered to a view that criminal activity is "forced" on the public through the
collusion of foreign criminals and corrupt public officials. The "pure native"
American, citizen or official, is corrupted by the "impure" criminal. In the
service of this nativist view, immigrant stereotypes 6' flourish.
Joseph Albini, in American Mafia,62 argues strongly that organized
crime is a product of American society rather than a foreign import. Such
an acceptance will allow us to either accept such activity as a "functional
part of our society" or "abolish it completely. ' 63 Albini finds that unfounded theories such as a "Sicilian Mafia" distract our attention from the true
state of affairs in favor of "providing rationalizations for a society that as yet
has not matured sufficiently to accept itself as it really is."'
Albini emphasizes that "although foreign elements entered into
American syndicated crime, their structure and function was one of
adaptation to the American model ' 6' and that assimilation into American
life by way of organized criminal activity developed in response to the
immigrant's anomie.6 This view is contrasted with the view ultimately
60. ALBINI, supra note 59, at 56-57.
61. For the purposes of this paper, a stereotype is:
[A]n exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to
justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category.
The stereotype acts both as a justificatory device for categorical
acceptance or rejection of a group, and as a screening or selective device
to maintain simplicity in perception and in thinking.
GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 187-88 (1958).
For the Kefauver Committee, the category was organized criminal and the stereotype the
Italian Mafia of secret codes and ceremonies.
62. See ALBINI, supra note 59. Albini states his preface that "[tihe purpose of the
work is to describe the functional aspects of criminal syndicates in American society itself."
Id. at vii.
63. Id. at 213-14.
64. Id. at 214.
65. Id. at 154.
66. Id. at 153-56 (emphasizing that alienation and frustration that result from the denial
of institutional means to achieve culturally encouraged ends such as wealth, political power,
and social position); MOORE, supra note 59, at vii, ix. In relation to the denial of Italian
entrance into mainstream America, one author points out that, in the early 1930s, one sixth
of the 30,000,000 Catholics in the U.S. were Italian, yet there was not one Italian bishop nor
archbishop. As to politics, in the early 1930s, there were almost no Italians on city payrolls
in top jobs, nor any discussion in the books of the era of notable Italian political leaders. Bell
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adopted by the Kefauver Committee that the "innocent, unguarded American
public is a victim of foreign evildoers who secretly rob it of its moral
virginity. ,,67
By adhering to the latter view, the Kefauver Committee fell easily into
a pattern of blaming outsiders for domestic problems rather than looking to
the inherent inequities in American society. The Committee ignored the
influence of anomie, developed a view heavily informed by nativism and
stereotype, and advanced a "trumped-up morality that disguised a social
r
hypocrisy."68
The path of least resistance was followed to its weakly
supported conclusion that a sinister conspiracy of foreign origin controlled
organized crime.69
Another model of organized crime competing with the Committee's
foreign conspiracy model was that of ethnic succession.70 In the major
urban centers there had been a distinct ethnic sequence in organized crime
membership. 7 While it may be true that membership in criminal activity
during the 1930s and 1940s was often of Italian origin; twenty years before,
Eastern European Jews were the most prominent; and before the Jews, the
Irish were dominant.7 2 As each group acquired the wealth and social
position accompanying the profits of illicit activity, they invested in
legitimate businesses and assumed a greater political role in the dominant,
legitimate society. 73 Criminal activity became a method of social climb74
ing.
In a similar manner to the ethnic groups which have preceded them,
"early Italian gangsters were hoodlums-rough, unlettered and young ....
supra note 59, at 146. Organized crime became a stepladder of social assent. See Bell supra
note 59, at 146-52 (discussing Italians' rise in social assent).
67. ALBINI, supra note 59, at 155-56.
68. Bell, supra note 59, at 153.
69. See supra note 8 (quoting one of the Committee's conclusions in the THIRD
REPORT, supra note 2). One author stated:
Unfortunately for a good story-and the existence of the Mafia would be
a whale of a story-neither the Senate Crime Committee in its testimony,
nor Kefauver in his book, presented any real evidence that the Mafia exists
as a functioning organization.
Bell, supra note 59, at 143.
70. See Bell, supra note 59, at 144 (discussing the Kefauver Committee's failure to
understand sociological facts, such as the process of ethnic succession).
71. See id. at 151 (discussing the "distinct ethnic sequence"). Bell also points out that
the ethnic succession process occurred independently but almost simultaneously in most of
the cities containing a large Italian constituency. Id. at 144.
72. Id. at 150-51.
73. Id. at 152-53 (discussing the move to legitimate business practices).
74. Id. at 151.
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Those who survived learned to adapt ....
They learned to dress conservatively. Their homes are in respectable suburbs. They sent their children to
good schools and had sought to avoid publicity."75 As Daniel Bell so
cogently points out:
[Tihe foundation of many a distinguished older American fortune
was laid by sharp practices and morally reprehensible methods
.... The early settlers and the founding fathers, as well as those
who 'won the west' and built up cattle, mining and other fortunes,
often did so by shady speculations and a not inconsiderable
amount of violence. They ignored, circumvented or stretched the
law when it ... served their purposes. This has not prevented
them and their descendants from feeling proper moral outrage
when under the changed circumstances of the crowded urban
environments later comers pursued equally ruthless tactics.76
For the same sort of extortion as that practiced by J.D . Rockefeller in
his consolidation of the petroleum industry 77 and the same sort of profiteering indulged in by Du Pont in gunpowder production7 ' and the same sort
of fraud engaged in by Daniel Drew, Jim Fisk, and Jay Gould in their
unconscionable manipulations of the shares of the Erie Railroad to their own
benefit, 79 these later immigrants were somehow different. They were
directed from without, not developed from within. They were not home-

75. Id. at 151.
76. Id. at 152.
77. See PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITZ, THE ROCKEFELLERS: AN AMERICAN
DYNASTY 33-35 (1976). Rockefeller pursued the consolidation of the petroleum refining
business, offering competitors a simple choice, either: (1) sell out to him; or (2) suffer the
consequences of a ruthless price war. Rockefeller's techniques of intimidation during price
wars involved more than simple price-cutting and extended to conspiracies with the railroads
to deny transportation to competitors or to charge those competitors an exorbitant price. Id.
78. See ZILO, supra note 37, at 56-60, 149-53. For example, during the Civil War, the
Du Ponts routinely raised prices for gun powder despite the fact their production costs
remained substantially the same. Id. at 58. Similarly, they successfully lobbied and bribed
Congress to defeat a proposed powder tax and efforts to establish government-owned powder
mills. Id. at 59.
79. The Erie came to be known as "the scarlet woman" of railroads. Nowhere was this
more evident than in the 1868 fight over the Erie between incumbent ownership Drew and
his cohorts and Cornelius Vanderbilt seeking to integrate the Erie into his developing New
York Central System. The Drew faction promiscuously and in defiance of a court order
printed new stock certificates, sold them to Vanderbilt to prevent him from cornering Erie
stock, and absconded with the six million dollars in proceeds from the sale to a hotel in New
Jersey out of reach of the New York courts. Eventually a compromise was reached between
the two parties. See ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, FALL OF THE HOUSE OF VANDERBILT 35-37
(1989).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

grown. They were imported and they brought their vile means of trade from
a corrupt foreign culture.
The Kefauver Committee rejected the sociological models emphasizing
the etiological significance of American culture in favor of a foreign
conspiracy model avoiding etiological responsibility through nativist
prejudice and immigrant stereotype. From this characterization of the
problem, the solution was clear. If the public can be kept vigilant of the
foreign menace and the tide of immigration can be stemmed and the foreign
perpetrators deported, the problem will disappear. The Kefauver Committee
urged precisely this solution.
III. NATIVISM IN THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS:
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE MYTH OF THE MAFIA
A. NATIVISM IN THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Although nativism pervaded and informed the investigations, conclusions, and recommendations of the Kefauver Committee, this does not mean
that the Committee acted with conscious, nativist-motivated, animus, and
bad faith. Instead, subtle nativist influences played their hand. During the
genesis and life of the Committee, nativist influences were strong, and
people in general, and politicians in particular, were often cajoled and
coerced by vague public and peer pressures.
In the Committee's conclusions and recommendations, nativist
sentiments were vindicated. The Committee forayed into virgin territory,
slew the foreign barbarians, and emerged the conquering heroes. They were
a tribute to all that was good and right about America. They effectively
placed the state imprimatur on a romantic myth that a sinister conspiracy of
foreign origin, the Mafia, existed and controlled organized crime, and that
this Mafia had effectively corrupted domestic, democratic government by
virtue of the coercive machinations of a secret code of fraternal loyalty
imported from, and directed by, Sicily.
While their effect defies exact measurement, the events of the period
certainly aid us in contextualizing the strength and pervasiveness of nativist
sentiment during the time of the Committee. On February 9, 1950, Senator
Joseph McCarthy delivered his famous Wheeling, West Virginia speech in
which he accused the State Department of harboring communists.8" On
June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered naval and land troops to repel the

80. RICHARD M.

FREELAND,

MCCARTHYISM 347 (1972).

THE TRUMAN

DOCTRINE AND THE ORIGINS OF
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North Korean invasion of South Korea."' On April 5, 1951, Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg were sentenced to death for allegedly selling nuclear
technology to the Soviets.8 2 The nation was besieged by foreign threats.
Careers were being made and lost in a society reeling in an anti-foreign
hysteria and desperately seeking comfort in the false security of conspiracy
theories and oaths of loyalty. Although we may never know the exact
extent, the Kefauver Committee's conclusion that a sinister conspiracy of
foreign origin controls organized crime was simply a product of its time.
The time was ripe for myth-making.
The Chairman of the Committee was Senator Estes Kefauver of
Tennessee. Other members included Senators Charles Tobey of New
Hampshire, Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, Lester Hunt of Wyoming, and
Herbert O'Conor of Maryland. 3 The Chief Counsel for the Committee
was Rudolph Halley. 4
Estes Kefauver grew up in a comfortable, upper-middle class Tennessee
home of somewhat notable pedigree.8 5 He attended local schools and the
University of Tennessee. Despite being an average student, he succeeded
in gaining admission to Yale Law School. He joined a Chattanooga law
firm in 1927 and became a strong local booster and all-around hand-shaker
and back-patter.8 6 In 1939, he succeeded in reaching the U.S. Congress
through a special election and served nearly ten years. Kefauver was a loyal
New Dealer and defender of the Tennessee Valley Authority. 7 In 1948,
he was elected to the U.S. Senate.88 Kefauver had been a strong antimonopolist as a Congressman and had served on the Select Committee on
Small Business and, as a senator, was instrumental in the introduction and
enactment of the Cellar-KefauverAmendment to the Clayton Anti-trust Act,
which corrected the infirmities and significantly strengthened the original

81.

HAROLD F. GOSWELL, TRUMAN'S CRISIS: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S.

TRUMAN 466 (1980).
82. WALTER & MIRIAM SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST 1 (Penguin Books 1973)

(1965).
83. See FIRST REPORT, infra note 117 (listing names of committee
first few pages); SECOND REPORT, supra note 8 (listing names of committee
first few pages); THIRD REPORT, supra note 2 (listing names of committee
first few pages); FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 (listing names of committee
first few pages).
84. See supra note 83 (listing also the name of the chief counsel).
85. MOORE, supra note 59, at 45.
86. Id. at 45.
87. Id. at 46.
88. Id. at 46-47.

members
members
members
members

within
within
within
within
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legislation.8 9 Anti-monopolist sentiment may have motivated Kefauver
toward the conclusion that organized crime was operating on a national
scale, but it was nativism which motivated Kefauver toward the conclusion
that a sinister foreign Mafia was behind organized crime's march toward
monopolization.
Charles Tobey was a colorful New Englander of common stock,
brimming with ambition, aspirations, and a willingness to work his way
up.90 Lacking a college education, he had been a clerk, chicken farmer,
salesman, banker, and shoe manufacturer. He was an elected local school
board member, governor, congressman, and, in 1939, senator from New
Hampshire. Initially he vigorously opposed Roosevelt's foreign policy, but
eventually came to accept a mild form of internationalism. 9'
92
Alexander Wiley was an affable senator with a keen political eye.
Prior to his election to the Senate, he had been district attorney of Chippewa
County, Wisconsin. Wiley had been an isolationist before World War II,
but moved toward being a mild internationalist, and in 1950 became the
ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
Judiciary Committee.93
Lester Hunt, a former dentist and semi-professional baseball player,
moved from state assembly to secretary of state to governor, and then, in
1948, to senator campaigning on a Fair Deal platform.9 4 His committee
assignments included the Armed Services Committee and the Commerce
Committee.95
Herbert O'Conor was a polished, calm, and cautious politician, moving96
from newspaper reporter to state attorney general to wartime governor.
Elected to the Senate in 1947, he was appointed to the Internal Security
Subcommittee and was seriously considered for the 1948 vice-presidential

89. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C). Cellar-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (prohibiting any mergers or acquisitions "where ... the
effect ... may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly .... ).
See JACK ANDERSON & FRED BLUMENTHAL, THE KEFAUVER STORY, 95-97 (1956)
[hereinafter ANDERSON]; CHARLES L. FONTENAY, ESTES KEFAUVER, A BIOGRAPHY, 110-14,
358-60 (1980); JOSEPH B. GORMAN, KEFAUVER: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, 27-30, 68-69,
298-313 (1971).
90. MOORE, supra note 59, at 67-68.
91. Id. at 67-68.
92. Id. at 68.
93. Id. at 68-69.
94. Id. at 66-67.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 66.
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nomination.

97

Rudolph Halley was considered a "boy genius" who enrolled at
Columbia Law School at the age of fourteen. 98 He graduated fourth in his
class in 1934, clerked three years for a U.S. District Judge, and entered the
U.S. District Attorney's office in 1937. Successful participation on the
Truman Committee and in private practice fully prepared Halley for his
service on the Kefauver Committee." It is generally conceded that Halley
was responsible for the orchestration of the proceedings, including the order
of the witnesses' appearances, general interrogation strategy, and the
majority of actual questioning."
Authors and commentators generally agree that Kefauver, Tobey, and
Halley were the most active and vocal members of the Committee.' 0 '
Thus we see Kefauver, the scion of a wealthy Tennessee family; Tobey, the
self-styled Yankee moralist; and Halley, the squeaky clean, masterfully
manipulative investigator poised against the foreign menace. The moral
outrage and tirades of the puritan Tobey must have conjured images of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony inquisitions. The evil were required to confess
to the pure. Their repentance was as important as their information. 2

97. Id.
98. Id. at 70.

99. Id.

100. The Committee declared:
Seldom, if ever before, has a congressional committee been favored with
such a splendid group.
The sparkling genius behind this excellent staff deserves the commendation not only of the Senate but of the entire Nation-the committee's chief
counsel, Rudolph Halley, of New York.
Mr. Halley displayed the keenest of insight into the nature of the problem,
and an indefatigable energy ... [M]r. Halley relentlessly and tirelessly
pursued his course against the most feared underworld gangs in America.
THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 25-26. See generally ALBINI, supra note 59; ALBANESE,
supra note 44, 59; Bell, supra note 59; MOORE, supra note 59.
101. See generally ALBINI, supra note 59; ALBANESE, supra note 44, 59; Bell, supra
note 59; MOORE, supra note 59.
102. Kefauver reports that during the questioning of Superintendent of the New York
State Police John Gaffney, Tobey ranted:
You certainly ...look like a plugged nickel to me as Superintendent of the
State Police ....You are no good in my judgment ... you are a counterfeit of what a good law enforcement officer should be. Just look at a
picture of yourself, just look at yourself and search your own conscience.
KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 277-78. While examining Meyer Lansky in New York, Tobey
commented, "There are some men who by their conduct in their life become a stench in the
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As Kai Erikson writes, "To repent is to agree that the moral standards of the
community are right and that the sentence of the court is just.' 0 3 The
Kefauver Committee's investigation of organized crime, and Tobey's antics
in particular, paid homage to society's moral standards and the committee's
conclusion that a foreign Mafia was in control of crime, absolved the society
of their sin.
Most authors agree that the Kefauver Committee discovered no new
important evidence concerning organized crime."°4 Instead, they merely
represented the evidence accumulated by various state and local crime
commissions; the information passed to them by then head of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, Harry J. Anslinger; °5 and the testimony of Federal
Narcotics Inspectors Follmer, Ahern, and Cahill."° Rufus King, a lawyer
for the California Crime Study Commission and assistant counsel for the
Kefauver Committee, wrote, "The cumulative denials and professed
ignorance [during the Kefauver hearings] suggest that it [the Mafia] is either
nostrils of decent American citizens, and in my judgment Lucky Luciano stands at the head
of the list." KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 34. Another author reports that during the
interrogation of Jefferson Parish Sheriff Frank "King" Clancy at the New Orleans hearings,
Tobey's righteous wrath erupted:
Why don't you resign and get out and put somebody in there that can
handle it-somebody who has some guts? It seems to me that a man like
you who stands before a committee of the Senate and admits he has broken
the law is not worth a damn! ... It is a revealing and disgusting thing that
a man like you can continue in office! I simply cannot sit and listen to this
type of what I call political vermin!
FONTENAY, supra note 89, at 93. One author reports that "[oln at least one occasion, Tobey
became so impassioned while inveighing against sin that he burst into tears." ANDERSON,
supra note 89, at 149.
103. KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 195 (1966).
104. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 133-34 (stating among other things "the senators
lacked adequate evidence for their conclusions"), ALBINI, supra note 59, at 210 (stating the
Committee did not prove the existence of "the mafia" rather it "merely assumed its
existence"); Bell, supra note 59, at 143 (stating "neither the Senate Crime Committee in its
testimony, nor Kefauver in his book, presented any real evidence that the Mafia exists as a
functioning organization"). See ALBANESE, supra note 44, 59, at 17, 31-36 (discussing
Authors' agreement that the Committee discovered no new important evidence).
105. In the Third Interim Report's analysis of crime syndication and the Mafia, the
Committee specifically refers to the testimony of Anslinger as support for the view that, "the
leading figures of organized crime do business with each other, get together ... and, on
THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 146.
occasion, do each other's dirty work ....
106. As one author stated, "the Committee not so much investigated the problem as it
dramatized the perspectives of the crime commissions on national crime syndicates and of
the Narcotics Bureau on the Mafia." MOORE, supra note 59, at 134. The Committee
eventually adopted the conspiracy theory urged upon them by Anslinger and the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.
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a very 'elusive, shadowy and sinister organization'-or else, equally
07
credibly, a romantic myth."'
What is of particular interest is that while the Committee's original
purpose was primarily the investigation of gambling, many authors believe
the information offered by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics formed the
factual basis for the Committee's final conclusion.0 8 One author claims
that Anslinger may have deliberately acted in bad faith during these
executive sessions by using the theory of a Mafia to lobby for larger
appropriations from Congress, mirroring the type of subterfuge used during
J. Edgar Hoover's supersale of the F.B.I. in the 1930s. ' "Anslinger in
1950 was the only major federal official who stood squarely in favor of the
proposition that organized crime was controlled by a Mafia."' 10 There is
additional support for the belief that the Committee was spoon-fed a Mafia
conspiracy theory by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics through the courtesy
of "Anslinger[,] [who] supplied the Committee with the services of Charles
Siragusa, who acted as chief investigator."'
In all, twenty-four Italian-Americans denied any knowledge of the
Mafia and others took refuge behind the Fifth Amendment." 2 Of the
107. Rufus King, The Control of Organized Crime in America, 4 STAN. L. REV. 52, 52
n.4 (1951-1952).
108. Numerous references to the testimony of the Narcotics Bureau appear particularly
in sections discussing the cohesiveness of the Mafia. The Third Interim Report endorses the
following description offered by the Narcotics Bureau:
Here is a Nation-wide organization of outlaws in a sort of oath-bound,
blood-cemented brotherhood dedicated to complete defiance of the law.'
Where personal advantage or interests are concerned, here is a more or less
permanently established network, an organized maze of underground
conduits, always ready and available when racket enterprise is to be
furthered.
THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 148.
109. See DONALD CRESSEY, THEFT OF A NATION: THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED
CRIME IN AMERICA 22 (1969); See also MOORE, supra note 59, at 114.
110. MOORE, supra note 59, at 114.
111. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 14. The Narcotics Bureau also provided Agent
John T. Cusack.
112. DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR., THE MAFIA MYSTIQUE 151 (1975). Kefauver describes
several such denials. When asked in Kansas City whether he belonged to the Mafia, Tony
Gizzo replied "What is the Mafia? I don't even know what the Mafia is." KEFAUVER, supra
note 8, at 27. In Washington, D.C., Salvatore Moretti, in response to Halley's question
whether he knew what the Mafia was, replied, "I am sorry, I don't know what you are
talking about." KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 27. In Chicago, Jack Dragna similarly denied
ever hearing of the Mafia. KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 27-30. The Committee interpreted
such blanket denials as admissions due in no small measure to the testimony of Phillip
D'Andrea in Chicago, who agreed with Associate Counsel George Robinson that it would
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forty-four individuals cited by the Committee for contempt, twenty-two were
of Italian descent." 3 The Committee's only "notable concrete piece of
evidence" indicating the existence of a Mafia was a photograph of twenty-4
three alleged Mafia leaders taken in a hotel room in Cleveland in 1928.1
Despite the paucity of direct evidence or testimony, the Committee readily
indulged their self-fulfilling prophecy. 5 and confirmed a romantic

be highly unusual for a person born in Sicily to have never heard of the Mafia. Id. at 28-29.
113. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 96-99. See also THIRD REPORT, supra note
2, at 188 (identifying thirty-three individuals cited for contempt to that date, where nineteen
of these were Italian-Americans).
114. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 149.
115. Self-fulfilling prophecy expresses the notion that we often uncover precisely and
only that which we originally set out to find, that our pre-investigative bias will many times
confirm itself through a covert process of selective attention to the information gathered. The
data transforms itself into what we prophesied it to be. In the case of the Kefauver
Committee, their prophecy of a sinister conspiracy of foreign origin was confirmed without
substantial direct evidence.
Nowhere is the concept of a nativist-motivated, self-fulfilling prophecy clearer than
in the case of Frank Costello (birth name of Castiglia). By the time of the Committee
hearings, Costello had already been identified as a central figure in an organized crime
conspiracy. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 186 (discussing the pursuit of Mr. Costello as the
Committee's "Mr. Big"); GORMAN supra note 89, at 89 (discussing Mr. Costello as an
"alleged boss of the New York underworld and one of the biggest stars of the New York
hearings."). It is not surprising then that the Committee fulfilled their prophecy by placing
Frank Costello at the core of the organized crime conspiracy. The testimony of Costello
during the hearings in New York generated the largest television audience and mass media
attention of any of the Committee's sessions. MOORE, supra note 59, at 184-86 (discussing
the television coverage). Costello's testimony was designed by Halley to be the glorious
finale of the Committee's hearings. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 186 (discussing Halley's
carefully planned appearance of witnesses); GORMAN, supra note 89, at 88 (stating "[m]ost
of the questioning of witnesses was handled by Halley, who played the role of the relentless
prosecutor while the senators themselves appeared in an almost judicial role."). Costello
came off as a nervous, belligerent, evasive, and not particularly credible witness. MOORE,
supra note 59, at 189-91 (discussing Castello's performance); GORMAN, supra note 89, at 89
(stating among other things "[Costello's] nervous gestures conveyed the frustrations of a man
who had much to hide, and his refusal to answer some questions fully and other questions
at all aroused indignant outrage among the public ....").
The Committee's nativist urges were satisfied in that a good deal of time was spent
interrogating Costello about his allegedly improper naturalization rather than focusing solely
on his alleged criminal activities. Costello was a bad man whose influence could have
perhaps been eliminated by a more stringent naturalization procedure. The inference was
clear. The existence and growth of organized crime could, for the most part, have been
avoided and could now be remedied through more rigorous enforcement of immigration laws.
The nativist myth was complete; it had reached its audience. Ithad assumed its most
virulent form in the evil, foreign person of Frank Costello. Costello became the central
image of the foreign menace.
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myth.
In the first of four reports, the Committee, primarily investigating
gambling, found that organized crime used interstate commerce but stopped
17
short of concluding that a conspiracy of national scope was behind it.
In the second, based on information provided by the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, the Committee acknowledged that the Mafia existed and was in
central control of a nationwide syndicate." 8 In the third, after substantial
questioning of, and universal denials from, alleged Mafia members, the
history of the Mafia was reviewed" 9 and the Committee revealed that the
Chicago and New York criminal syndicates were linked by a sinister
organization called the Mafia, which had ties with other nations and
descended directly from Sicily. 20 In its final report, the Committee
concluded that public corruption caused by organized crime had permeated
to all levels of government in cities large and small 121 while restating their
finding that a sinister conspiracy of foreign origin controls organized
crime. 122 Constant citizen vigilance was advised. 23 Local crime commissions were encouraged. 24 A Federal Crime Commission was also
25
urged.
First we have organized crime, but it is not necessarily national. Then
we have national organized crime with an identifiable central control. Next
we have national organized crime which is centrally controlled, affiliated
with, and descended from a foreign culture. Finally, we have national
organized crime centrally controlled by foreigners which has infiltrated,
saturated, and corrupted the entire nation. We found the imported enemy,
we stereotyped it, and we plotted to destroy it. It seems the most natural of
scenarios for a nation which saw itself in imminent peril from foreign

116. See generally THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 144-50.
117. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED
CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 2370, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950),
microformed on U.S. Serial Set. No. 11371, Vol. 5, Report 2370 [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
118. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 8, at II.
119. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 147-48.
120. See id. at 150.
121. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6.
122. Id. at 30. See also THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 144-50 (offering a detailed,
lengthy analysis of crime and the Mafia).
123. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. See also THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 18688 (first recommending citizen vigilance).
124. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. See also THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 30
(first recommending local crime commissions).
125. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. See also THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 8

(first recommending a federal commission).
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corruption.
B. NATIVISM IN THE KEFAUVER COMMITrEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

During the genesis of the Committee, state and local officials were
clamoring for a national investigation and the Committee gave them one.
An interesting anomaly appears between the findings of the Committee and
its recommendations. The Committee discovered an organized crime
conspiracy of national scope, then found pervasive state and local corruption
of public officials by this organized criminal conspiracy, and finally found
organized crime at the throat of the nation. It might initially seem that a
problem national in scope would require a solution national in scope. One
would expect, given these findings and keeping in mind that the primary
purpose of any congressional investigating committee is to recommend
remedial action to its parent body, 26 that the Committee's recommendations would have emphasized greater federal involvement in the investigation and prosecution of organized criminal activities. Instead, the Committee took a different tack-a tack which took maximum advantage of the
nativist winds. The Committee filled their sails and steered a steady course
into the uncharted open seas of immigrant stereotype.
The Committee recommended more effective state and local vigilance
over the activities of organized crime. The Committee stated, "[T]he crisis
of law enforcement which has been uncovered by the committee is basically
a State and local crisis,"'' 27 and that "[a]ny program for controlling
organized crime must take into account the fundamental nature of our
governmental system. The enforcement of the criminal law is primarily a
State and local responsibility."' 128 In the popular press of the time,
Kefauver emphasized the role of the individual citizen and the smaller
political units in curbing the growth of organized crime while reiterating his
belief in a foreign Mafia conspiracy. 129 This faith in the power of the
smaller governmental unit and each private citizen is derived from the belief
that:
As a result of the committee's activities there exists great public
awareness of the nature and extent of organized crime. The public
now knows that the tentacles of organized crime reach into
virtually every community throughout the country. It also knows
126. See infra notes 208, 211 and accompanying text.

127. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.

128.
129.
Apr. 14,
Apr. 20,

Id. at 5.
See Estes Kefauver, What I Found in the Underworld, SAT. EVE. POST, Mar. 251951, at 19. See also Interview with Estes Kefauver, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
1951, at 32, 53; KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 12-18.
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that law enforcement is essentially a local matter calling for
constant vigilance at the local level and a strengthening of the
public and private morality."3
The Committee urged coordinated information, public involvement, and
private initiative.'
The basis of their remedial recommendations was clear. The growth
of organized crime and its corrupting influence in state and local government was due to a faltering of conventional morality in the face of imported
crime and corruption.' 32 Only an awakened and properly informed
citizenry could succeed in stemming the tide of organized crime's activities
and corrupting foreign influence. Unfortunately, what the Committee
awakened the citizenry to was conceived of as a foreign menace and what
they considered proper information was heavily tainted by nativist bias.
For Kefauver, the role of the federal government was one of "leadership and guidance" and he saw "95 per cent" of any cleanup dependent on
"local interest."'133 The federal government should:
[P]rovide leadership and guidance in the struggle against organized crime .... [P]rovide maximum coordination in law[S]eenforcement agencies to insure complete efficiency....
cur[e] better interstate cooperation in dealing with crime. [S]ee
that the channels of interstate commerce, transportation, communication .... and mails are not used to facilitate ...criminal gangs
and syndicates. [And] see that gangsters and racketeers are
stripped of as much of their ill-gotten gains as possible through
vigorous enforcement of the income-tax laws."
In order to accomplish these general "leadership and guidance" goals,
the Committee offered more specific recommendations. Their leading
recommendation for action at the federal level was the establishment of a
"National Crime Coordinating Council."' 135 While such a Council would
be created by the federal government, it would be "composed of representatives of privately established local crime commissions .... Congress would
appropriate the sum of $100,000 ...for the purpose of permitting it to
organize and begin its activities .... Thereafter, the Council would be
expected to obtain funds from charitable foundations or other private

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.

Id.
See id. at 2,18-19 (discussing corruption at local levels).
Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast. Nov. 12, 1950).
THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
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sources."' 3 6 This Council would "keep the searchlight of public vigilance
turned upon crime and corruption that leaves at the local level the basic
responsibility for law enforcement and at the same time affords centralized
guidance and coordination." 3
Other recommendations for federal action included further study of
organized crime by Congress, improvement in the enforcement of narcotics
laws, and the creation of special "racket squads" by the Treasury and Justice
Departments to deal with specific aspects of the organized crime problem. 138 In order to aid the federal government in their investigative
chores, the Committee also recommended that "[t]he Attorney General of the
United States should be given authority to grant immunity from prosecution
to witnesses whose testimony may be essential to an inquiry conducted by
a grand jury, or in the course of a trial or a congressional investigation."' 39
Following from their finding of foreign control of organized crime, the
Committee recommended that "immigration laws should be amended to
facilitate deportation of criminal and other undesirable aliens.'"'° Further,
"[t]he Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 should be amended to provide
punishment for smuggling, concealing, or harboring aliens not entitled by
law to enter or reside in the United States."''
Finally, "[t]he Attorney
General should be authorized to revoke suspensions of deportation and to
make such revocation ground for the cancellation of certificates of
naturalization granted aliens who have succeeded in getting their immigration status recognized but who are found to be ineligible for such relief."' 42 A call for restrictive immigration laws, the hallmark of earlier
nativist upsurges, was sounded loud and clear in the Committee's recom136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id. at 6-11.
139. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 17 (first recommending this expansion of power).
See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (endorsing the recommendations contained in
the THIRD REPORT).
140. THIRD REPORT,

supra note 2, at 15 (first recommending this expansion of power).
See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-11 (endorsing the recommendations contained in
the THIRD REPORT).

Only the Federal Government can take affirmative action to rid our shores
of alien criminals who have become members of predatory criminal groups.
THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
141. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 15 (first recommending this expansion of power).
See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-11 (endorsing the recommendations contained in
the THIRD REPORT).
142. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 15 (first recommending this expansion of power).
See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-11 (endorsing the recommendations contained in
the THIRD REPORT).

1996]
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mendations.
None of the Committee's recommendations inspired legislation although
the Committee prepared and introduced twenty-two bills in the Senate. 43
The Committee should not be considered a failure though. It was successful
in its quest to "inform the public" of the dangers of organized crime and
many local crime commissions arose in response to the Committee's call for
greater local involvement.14
While the Committee's recommendations encouraged broader federal
cognizance of organized crime's activities, the federal government's
expanded role was primarily to aid state and local officials. The federal
government was urged to expand their supervisory and coordinating
role. 45 The main areas in which the federal government was encouraged
to step up their prosecutorial role were taxation and immigration.' 6 While
taxation has been an area of collateral state and federal jurisdiction,
immigration has traditionally been exclusively within the federal domain. 47 The Committee recommended the federal government act only
in those areas where the state has been preempted. Otherwise, for the
Committee, the onus of responsibility for maintaining vigilance over the
activities of organized crime lay with state and local governments and
emphasized an ounce of prevention over a pound of cure.
Although the Committee was careful to point out that criminal law
enforcement had traditionally been the province of state and local governments,148 the federal government, in the period since the Committee, has
conceived and executed a policy consistent with federal domination in the
investigation and prosecution of organized crime. 49 As soon as the
Committee reached its nativist-motivated conclusion that a sinister

143. For a discussion of these bills, see King, supra note 107, at 57-59.
144. The Committee reported that "new crime commissions have been formed or are
in the making [in] Tampa, Fla.; Dallas, Tex.; New Orleans, La.; Des Moines, Iowa; New
York, both state and city; Detroit, Mich.; and in New England." See THIRD REPORT, supra
note 2, at 190. The Committee also noted the increase in grand jury and legislative activity
designed to curb or punish organized crime. See id. at 189.
145. Id. at 6 ("The Federal Government must provide leadership and guidance in the
struggle against organized crime ....").
146. Id. at 7-20 (outlining the committee recommendations).
147. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "establish a uniform
Rule of Naturalization ....). See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (indicating
Congress' exclusive power to regulate aliens); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)
(illustrating Congress' power to regulate exclusion, admission and expulsion of aliens).
148. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
149. See supra note 15 (providing examples of federal legislation regarding organized
crime).
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conspiracy of foreign origin controlled organized crime, their recommendations emphasizing state and local law enforcement as the primary means to
combat it, were doomed.
First, the theory of a Mafia established that organized crime was a
problem with foreign dimensions. As such, the federal government was
implicated as gate-keeper of the national borders. Where aliens are
concerned, the federal government is concerned. Nevertheless, the federal
government was reluctant to follow the nativist recommendations of the
Committee. Investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration, rather
than deportation, have been the chosen federal avenues of attack against
organized crime. 3 The foreign aspect of organized crime became more
a matter of form than substance. Despite the fact that the expanded racket
squads indicted hundreds of mobsters in the period following the Committee, "[b]y the end of 1955, only five had been deported, proceedings against
six had been dismissed in the courts and action was pending against only
thirty-two others. This record struck Kefauver as poor..' 5 1
Second, the practical realities of dealing with a problem of such a scope
overwhelmed the nativist sentiment which had stereotyped it. Nativism was
to yield to the practical morality of publicity. Combatting organized crime
became a high profile activity, in no small measure the result of the
attention and publicity the Committee's hearings had generated. National
agencies and individuals were eager to step into the spotlight and upstage
state and local efforts.
Third, since it had been demonstrated that at least semi-organized
criminals were using the means of interstate commerce to do their dirty
deeds, federal involvement was unavoidable and imminently warranted. The
federal government needed to respond and it had the constitutional power
and precedents to do so. 52 The federal government eventually legislated
themselves into dominance.'5 3 When the theory of a Mafia served the end
150. See ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 157-58 (providing examples of the results from
the Committee recommendations, however, indicating that the recommendation of deporting
alien criminals did not fare well).
151. Id. at 157.
152. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl.
2 (granting Congress the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes"). See NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding federal labor relations laws
with regard to a large corporation that manufactured steel in one state because of the
significant economic effect upon interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1II
(1942) (upholding a marketing quota as applied to a farmer who grew wheat for his own
consumption only on his 23-acre farm because of the cumulative effect of all such small
farmers on interstate commerce).
153. See supra note 15.
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of justifying or publicizing needed legislation, it was available.15
What becomes clear is that the federal government acted on the
Committee's findings and not on their recommendations. Their findings
indicated the compelling need for greater federal control, yet the Committee
betrayed those findings in their recommendations when they emphasized
state and local control. Congress charted a different course than that
recommended by the Committee. The Committee inadvertently created the
very means of their recommendations' destruction when they confirmed the
romantic myth that a sinister conspiracy of foreign origin controlled
organized crime.
Whatever the future course taken by subsequent federal law enforcement efforts, the Committee's recommendations represented a surrender to
nativism and fully pandered to the simplistic imagery, stereotype, and
innuendo which had sustained nativist urges throughout its infamous life in
America. The Committee's recommendations, incited by the television
hearings, called for heightened public awareness coupled with stiffer
immigration laws. This sort of grass roots appeal to the people to wise up
and protect themselves from foreign corrupters through restrictive immigration has been the primary manifestation of nativism throughout American
history.' 55
C. NATIVISM AND THE ROLE OF TELEVISION

The Kefauver Committee was the first to reap the rewards of live
television exposure. 5 6 Along with Joseph McCarthy's HUAC,' 57 the
154. The Senate Subcommittee on Investigations hearings on organized crime in 1963
featured the testimony of Joe Valachi who revealed the existence and practices of the Mafia.
ALBANESE, supra note 44, 59, at 42. "[This testimony was used] as part of the rationale for
[federal] legislation permitting widespread use of wiretaps and witness immunity through
sections of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, respectively." ALBANESE, supra note 44, 59, at 42. See
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C); Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.). See generally PETER MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS (1969).
155. See supra notes 21-22, and accompanying text.
156. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 168-71, 183-86, 200-04 (discussing the use of
television and its impact). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99-103 (providing the
Committee's view on use of television in congressional hearings).
157. House on Unamerican Activities Committee (HUAC). Created on May 26, 1938,
pursuant to H.R. Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 CONG. REc. 7568, 7586 (1938) and
seven years later amended to make it a standing committee pursuant to H.R. Res. 5, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 10, 15 (1945). See Alan I. Bigel, The First Amendment and
National Security: The Court Responds to Governmental Harassment of Alleged Communist
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Kefauver Committee served to initially define the positive and negative
58
political power inherent in the embryonic communications medium.
Kefauver had originally planned that the standing Judiciary Committee
would carry out the probe of organized crime in interstate commerce but,
during the compromise negotiations in which both the Judiciary and
Commerce Committees claimed jurisdiction, it was decided that a special
committee would carry out the probe.
Kefauver had long opposed special committees, finding that "being a
special group, the committee usually feels it has to justify its existence by
doing something sensational; hence it grabs for the headlines, and its
performance often degenerates into pure vaudeville."'' 59 He cautioned that
"it is not within the scope of Congress to strive for 'exposures' merely for
political purposes."'"
"When I [Kefauver] mention Congressional
vaudeville antics, . . . I refer specifically to 1. Useless and expensive
junketing, 2. Headline-hunting Congressional hearings."''
Kefauver thus
presaged many of the criticisms aimed at his Committee. In so many ways,
the Kefauver Committee hearings progressively deteriorated into a traveling
road show telling tales of the mysterious and the sinister.
On May 26-27, 1950, the first hearings in Miami took place' 62
without previous announcement. 63 Kefauver and Hunt were the only
Committee members present, along with Chief Counsel Halley. 164 From
that point onward, public and press interest swelled. Television coverage
began during the New Orleans hearings in January 1951 and attracted
viewers from several southern states. 65 The local impact of televised
hearings was substantial, and Kefauver granted permission to continue
coverage in Detroit on February 8-10 and again in St. Louis on February 23-

Sympathizers, 19 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 885,888-95 (1993) (discussing the House Un-American
Activities Committee).
158. While Kefauver certainly benefitted from his national television exposure,
eventually parlaying his notoriety into a failed presidential bid in 1952. ANDERSON, supra
note 89, chs. 19-22 (discussing Kefauver's bid for the Democratic nomination for president
in the 1952 election and subsequent rejection by the party for vice-president with Truman).
159. Estes Kefauver, Let's Cut Out These Congressional High Jinks, AM. MAG., Apr.
1948, at 25, 144.
160. Id. at 145.
161. Id. at 125.
162. KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 11 (stating beginning date of Miami hearings);
MOORE, supra note 59, at 87-88 (stating the committee held two days of executive hearings).
163. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 87 (discussing the Committee's "sudden[] descent"
to Miami).
164. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 87.
165. Id. at 168.
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24."6
From that point onward, all open sessions of the Committee
hearings were televised. Time magazine believed that the same audience
interested in the political hearings would also be interested in subscription
advertising and decided to sponsor the hearings in New York and
Washington over a fifteen-day period. 67 Coverage and sponsorship
168
expanded as the public interest grew.
The New York hearings, conceived by Halley as the grand finale of the
investigation, opened on March 12, 1951, and were carried to twenty cities
along the eastern seaboard and the midwest.' 69 One author reports that
during the New York hearings, where Costello and O'Dwyer were the
principal witnesses and the Mafia Was the central issue, "[i]t was estimated
that an average of 86.2% of those viewing television watched the hearings"
and that "an average of 69.7% of the TV sets in the New York area were
on during the hearings, twice as many as during a weekday World Series
game in October 1950. '' 7° An estimated 30 million viewers watched the
testimony of Costello and O'Dwyer in New York.' 71 Stores reported a
decline in Easter shopping, movie theaters were empty, and in Brooklyn the
Red Cross drive faltered as 35,000 housewives gave up door-to-door
solicitation in order to stay home and watch the hearings. 72 One biographer of Kefauver reports that the characters "were playing out a human
drama so exciting and full of suspense that had it been submitted as fiction
' 73
it would have been rejected as unrealistic."'
The universally unanswered question is how much did Kefauver and
166. Id. at 169.

167. The Committee felt the issue of commercial sponsorship of the broadcasting of
congressional hearings significant enough to warrant comment. The Committee recognized
that stations wishing to cover the hearings would invariably be forced to cancel existing
programming with a corresponding loss of revenue unless commercial sponsorship of the
hearings themselves were permitted. They acquiesced to commercial sponsorship but
developed and utilized an eight-rule "code of conditions" governing the use of sponsored
programming and encouraged the Senate and the House to adopt their code for all such
committees. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 102-03.
168. Typical of the press coverage of the New York hearings were: Mighty Interesting
Visit, TIME, Apr. 2, 1951, at 16-17; Who's a Liar?, LIFE, Apr. 2, 1951, at 19-25; Biggest
Show Panics the Public, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 1951, p. 21-24; Crime Hunt in Foley Square,
TIME, Mar. 26, 1951, at 22-24; Biggest Show on Earth, TIME, Mar. 21, 1951, at 80-81; The
U.S. Gets a Close Look at Crime, LIFE, Mar. 26, 1951, at 33-39.
169. MOORE, supra note 59, at 182-186.
170. Senate Probe Stopped New York's Clock, Bus. WK., Mar. 24, 1951, at 19.
171. This is the Committee's own estimate. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
See also SMITH, supra note 112, at 134 (discussing the success of the television hearings).
172. Senate Probe Stopped New York's Clock, BuS. WK., Mar. 24, 1951, at 21.
173. GORMAN, supra note 89, at 87.
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the Committee orchestrate the high-profile, career-boosting publicity they
received and how much was simply a matter of blind luck, of being at the
right place at the right time? There is evidence to suggest that the answer
is equal parts of both. It is undeniable that as a first-term senator and loyal
Democrat, Kefauver hoped a crime probe would help his chances for reelection and/or advancement, as well as enhance the Democratic Party's
image.174 Indeed, at least one author notes that Kefauver may have
learned the value of opportunism from the experience of his cousin,
"No matter what he turned up
Governor Joseph W. Folk of Missouri.'
in the probe, he could not fail to come out of it a hero, a stalwart crusader
against crime, a champion of lily-white puritanism."'' 76 To counter such
charges of opportunism, it must be remembered that Kefauver had been
issue of organized crime for a
interested and somewhat involved in the
7
number of years prior to the hearings.'
It is equally undeniable that the Kefauver Committee was the
beneficiary of being at the right place at the right time during the advent and
expansion of television coverage. 78 On March 30, 1948, three years prior
to the Committee hearings, there had been television coverage of the Senate
79
Armed Services Committee hearing on universal military training.
Shortly after that, there was coverage of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities hearings involving Alger Hiss.1 8' The Kefauver
Committee was only the fifth congressional committee to permit television

174. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 45-48 (discussing Kefauver's rise to power and his
opportunism).
175. Id. at 45. Governor Folk launched an impressive political career and presidential
bid in the wake of Lincoln Steffens' exposes of corruption in St. Louis. Id.
176. ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 139.
177. During the five years prior to his chairmanship of the Committee, Kefauver sat on
the. Judiciary Committee during the investigation of judicial impropriety in the case of
District Judge Albert Johnson of Pennsylvania. In addition, Kefauver had been involved in
an independent review of the state and local crime committee's findings along with Max
Goldschein and Boris Kostelanetz. Most authors agree that it was during this time that
Kefauver's interest in organized crime's influence on interstate commerce was piqued.
Additionally, authors agree that the information gathered during this period represented the
bulk of the information "uncovered" by the Committee. See KEFAUVER, supra note 8;
GORMAN supra note 89, at 80; FONTENAY, supra note 89, at 140-43; ANDERSON, supra note
89, at 165.
178. Indeed, the Committee admits as much recognizing that, "a major part of the credit
for the vital impact of this committee's most recent hearings on the public was due to the
televising of the sessions. Never, prior to that time, had a congressional hearing received...
such a huge audience." THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
179. GORMAN, supra note 89, at 87.
180. Id. at 87.
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and the first to allow live coverage of the actual hearings.' 81 Prior to this
time, television coverage of congressional committee hearings consisted of
short takes aired as part of the network's normal daily news coverage.'82
Although they were not the first, Life proclaimed:
[T]he week of March 12, 1951 will occupy a special place in
history. The U.S. and the world has never experienced anything
like it....

The first big television broadcast of an affair of their

government, the broadcast from which all future uses of television
in public affairs must date ....

Never before had the attention of

the nation been riveted so completely on a single matter. The
Senate Investigation into organized crime was almost the sole
subject of national conversation.83
The New York Herald Tribune asked, "If television can educate (and,
incidentally, entertain) the whole population on crime and politics, why not
take it in Congress [and even] court trials of broad and legitimate interest?""' Newsweek called for "as many Congressional hearings as possible
[to be] televised."' 8' 5 To the contrary, the legal profession commented that
"the glaring melodrama" of television's lights and camera obscure the search
for truth. 86 The overall judgment of the intellectual, more scholarly
community was that the dangers of television coverage substantially
outweighed the potential benefits.' 87
The constitutional rights of witnesses were subjected to new challenges
with the advent of televised hearings. The benefits and burdens of continual
public scrutiny wore on witness and interrogator alike. 88 The propriety
or impropriety of televised proceedings was a substantial issue.'89 Kefauv181. Id. at 87.
182. See id. at 87. Newsreel footage and still photography were permitted as well.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
183. Who's a Liar?, LIFE, Apr. 2, 1951, at 22.
- 184. Quoted in The Biggest Show, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 1951, at 52, 57.
185. In Passing, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1951, at 46.
186. The Kefauver Show, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1951, at 54.
187. See Thurman Arnold, Mob Justice And Television, THE ATLANTA MONTHLY, June
1951, at 69; Lloyd Cutler & Herbert Packer, Make Them Tell Congress the Truth or Take
the Consequences, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1952, at 82-83; Kefauver's Court: Trial by
Camera, CATHOLIC WORLD, May 1951, at 81-85; Allen T. Klots, Trial by Television,
HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 1951, at 90-94; Telford Taylor, The Issue is Not TV, but Fair Play,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 15, 1951, at 12.
188. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 225-30 (debating about the Committee's use of
television).
189. In its Third Interim Report, the Committee expressed concern over the possible
invasion of witnesses' fights of privacy by the broadcast of their face as well as threats to
other constitutional rights. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 25. The Committee discoursed

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

er stated, "I personally have always been opposed to hearings which
degenerated into 'smear' sessions or witch hunts," and he found that "[a]ll
of us on the Crime Committee were determined from the outset to do our
best to prevent this sort of thing from occurring."''
This sanctimonious
sentiment was qualified somewhat when he wrote, "Actually and sincerely,
I do not believe that testifying under television lights and cameras is any
191
great ordeal, except for witnesses who want to be troublesome."
Troublesome or not, witnesses testifying before the Committee were caught
between the proverbial rock and a hard place. "If a witness testified falsely,
he faced perjury charges; if he testified truthfully of violating state and some
federal laws, he faced prosecution partly based on his own statements; and
if he refused to testify on matters not covered by the immunity laws (such
as violations of state gambling laws), he faced contempt charges. ' '192
The first legal challenge to television's presence in congressional
hearings occurred as a result of the St. Louis hearings. 9 3 Several witnesses refused to testify before the cameras, arguing that it invaded their right
to privacy.19' Kefauver responded that he did not control station programming and that television was analogous to other media permitted in the
hearing room. 95 Witnesses were not to be allowed to dictate the
arrangements for congressional hearings." 9 Carroll withdrew his objection
and eventually testified in Washington. 97
Later in the hearings, Morris Kleinman and Louis Rothkopf refused to
testify unless the television and other media were removed.' 98 The
Senators rejected this demand; the witnesses continued to refuse to testify;
the Committee cited them for contempt. One biographer reports that
"Kefauver said the committee was citing them for contempt to make a legal
at length in the Final Report, admitting that congressional hearings are substantively different
than court trials and that television coverage is substantively different than other forms of
media coverage. The Committee ultimately concludes, "[tihere falls upon the shoulders of
the committee conducting the hearing the responsibility of maintaining a fair and equitable
balance between the rights of both the public and the witness." FINAL REPORT, supra note
2, at 100.
190. KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 316.
191. Id. at 315.
192. MOORE, supra note 59, at 229-30.
193. Id. at 170.
194. THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
195. MOORE, supra note 59, at 170. In fact, the Committee ultimately concluded that
television cameras were less obtrusive than already permissible newsreels since cameras
were quieter and did not require as much light. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
196. MOORE, supra note 59, at 170.
197. Id.
198. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 95-97.
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test of the part television could play in congressional hearings." ' 99 The
Senate upheld the Committee's citations. 2" The courts disagreed with the
Committee and the Senate finding in favor of Kleinman and Rothkopf,
holding that in some situations, the mere fact of televising the proceeding
created an improper atmosphere. 2 '
Ironically, at the opening of the New York hearings on March 21,
1951, Kefauver said:
This is not a grand jury. We do not want to cause anybody any
trouble if we can help it .... We ask the cooperation of the
witnesses ... to give this Senate Committee such facts that we
can present the picture to Congress and upon which Congress can
pass needed legislation. 2
The Committee then proceeded to stage its grand finale with its parade of
notables. Deepening this irony is the fact that two years before the hearings,
Kefauver informally recommended that Congress "[s]et up rules clearly
guaranteeing to witnesses before Congressional investigations the right to a
reasonable period of cross-examination of their accusers."2 3
At this late point in the hearings, the Committee already possessed all
the information, gathered through government bureaus and informants, upon
which they would ultimately base their conclusions. 2°4 At the same time,
they realized that a witness' admissions could subject him to prosecution.
The Committee surely realized they were going to receive denials or
assertions of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in
response to many of their questions.2 5 In fact by this time taking the
Fifth had become so commonplace that Tobey had remarked to one alleged
gambler, "Why don't you have a little sign painted and hold it up and save
your voice?" 206 Yet the Committee called the witnesses and asked the
questions anyway.
The Committee placed witnesses' individual rights in jeopardy when
it was not essential to their institutional purpose that they do so. 20 7 They
199. FONTENAY, supra note 89, at 184.
200. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 96-99.
201. U.S. v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.C. 1952).
202. ALAN BARTH, GOVERNMENT By INVESTIGATION 69-70 (1955).
203. Estes Kefauver, Let's Cut Out These Congressional High Jinks, AM. MAG., Apr.
1948, at 25, 145.
204. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text (discussing the hearings).
205. The Committee noted the expansiveness of the privilege against self-incrimination,
finding that, "under the present state of the law, a witness may invoke the privilege even
where the possibility of incrimination is quite remote." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
206. KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 7.
207. This is not to say that the Committee was indifferent to the plight of .witnesses.
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asked the public to draw damaging inferences when witnesses resorted to the
privilege against self-incrimination. If the goal of the proceeding was solely
to gather facts necessary to support their remedial recommendations, 2" the
Committee could have simply taken the facts gathered through executive
sessions and unnamed informants and done so. Instead, the Committee
produced the unnecessary spectacle of a public inquisition not only in New
York, but throughout the latter stages of the investigation as well. 2" The
secretly gathered information made such a spectacle possible, and the media
opportunities made it irresistible. As Kefauver explained, the Committee
became more than a group of officials. "We became a national crusade, a
...2'0 The Commitgreat debating forum, an arouser of public opinion.
tee became consumed in its public image as crusaders; defenders of the
political faith against the foreign infidels.
While the Committee reacted to rather than initiated television
coverage, it must be kept in mind that Kefauver intended that the Committee
212
21
hearings would arouse the public. 1 Publicity was a primary concern.

They recognized that, "Itihere falls upon the shoulders of the committee ... the responsibility of maintaining a fair and equitable balance between the rights of both the public and the
witness." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 100.
208. The Committee constantly reiterated the distinction between congressional factfinding hearings and trial-type proceedings, finding that the former does not significantly
implicate the fate of an individual and therefore the constitutional issue of self-incrimination
is less important. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 101. The Committee attempted to
distinguish United States v. Hoffman, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (upholding the right of a
defendant before a grand jury to refuse to state even the nature of his business by noting that
a grand jury has the power to indict while a congressional committee is empowered to obtain
information only). FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
209. In this respect the Committee found that television coverage had "a most salutary
For the first
effect in awakening the public to the menace of organized racketeering ....
THIRD REPORT,
time the public was able to see and hear the notorious hoodlums ....
supra note 2, at 24.
210. KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 283.
211. As the Committee observed:
The function of a congressional committee ... is to obtain information for
the purposes of enacting legislation. The legislative process includes the
important step of enlightening the public regarding the matters under
inquiry in order that intelligent public opinion will be developed. The
more access the public has to the hearings the more thoughtful will its
opinion be. This is a necessary part of the democratic process.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 101.
212. The Committee declared, "The public has a right to be informed of the activities
of its Government and is entitled to have access to public hearings .... " FINAL REPORT,
supra note 2, at 100. They further found that, "[tlelevision is essentially another improved
method of public communication." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
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They were putting the word out, wising up the naive, "informing the
public. ' 21 3 Kefauver believed that "[w]e can correct the evils plaguing our
country if the good citizens will open their eyes to our danger," 2 4 and
could avoid sinking "to the point where democracy and national strength are
utterly lost. ' 21 1 So anxious was Kefauver to "inform the public" that, prior
to the release of the Committee's final report, he published a four-part
article in the SaturdayEvening Post in which he summarized his view of the
evidence and confirmed the existence of the Mafia.21 6 A brief flurry of
news stories followed the Committee's hearings. The New York Times Index
shows five citations for the Mafia in 1950 and eleven for 1951. Prior to this
time, there had been a relative silence on the Mafia.
The Committee's cavalier conclusion based on scant, shaky information
gave the impression that a thorough investigation had been carried out when
actually one had not. In this manner, the public was led to believe that
there was a hard-fact basis for the Committee's conclusion that the Mafia
controlled organized crime. 217 Trading on the Mafia's demonstrated
publicity value, subsequent coverage vicariously bootstrapped legitimacy
from the Committee's investigation and the sensational theory of the Mafia
captured the popular imagination.21 s
As Albini states, "[a]lthough Kefauver states that he found the existence
of 'the Mafia' in the United States, in reality he merely assumed its
existence., 2 9 Gordon Hawkins points out that many of the arguments
offered as proof of the existence of the Mafia are similar to those offered as
proof of the existence of God. 220 "[Public officials] assert[ed] . . . their
belief in the Mafia; the Narcotics Bureau thinks that a worldwide dope ring
allegedly run by Luciano is part of the Mafia; but the only other 'evidence'
presented ... is that certain crimes bear 'the earmarks of the Mafia.' ' 22'
Committee members' natural curiosity in the mystery of a secret society
of wealth and power captured them much as it captured television audiences
in their homes. The Committee and the public were observing the same
demeanor evidence of the same witnesses at the same time. Perhaps they
213. The Committee opined, "[tlelevision can undoubtedly be a tremendous power for
good; as a means of public education it is superb." THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
214. KEFAUVER, supra note 8, at 18.
215. Id. at 17.
216. Estes Kefauver, What I Found in the Underworld, 223 SAT. EVE. POST No. 42,
April 7, 1951, at 19.
217. See MOORE, supra note 59, at 241-42.
218. See CRESSEY, supra note 109, at 16-24. See generally MAAS, supra note 154.
219. ALBINI, supra note 59, at 210.
220. Gordon Hawkins, God and the Mafia, 14 PUB. INTEREST 24-51 (Winter, 1969).
221. Bell, supra note 59, at 143 (emphasis in original).
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saw something the cold record does not reveal. It was a new experience.
Citizens could see, as well as hear, in the comfort of their own living rooms,
the witnesses, the interrogators, the excitement, and the innuendo. The
Committee must have come to feel they were speaking directly to and for
the people of the nation.
Television coverage permitted a different sort of relationship between
citizen and representative to be established.
This new relationship
manifested itself in the Committee's ultimate conclusions and recommendations. They had all sleuthed out the foreign conspiracy together. They had
seen it with their own eyes, albeit carefully orchestrated by the Committee.
The Committee's conclusions and recommendations spoke directly to the
individual citizen, not to the national representative body, but right there at
home. The message was clear. They had seen the enemy and it was not
themselves. Instead, organized crime, a sinister conspiracy of foreign origin,
threatened the purity of the American heart and soul. Nativism provided the
mise en scene for the Committee's theatrical production, and television
coverage guaranteed the nativist message would reach a broader audience
than ever before.
CONCLUSION

Through the course of this article, nativism's infamous history in
American culture and its influence on sociological theories of organized
crime have been observed. Further, we have taken note of nativism's more
specific role in the Kefauver Committee's hearings, conclusions, and
recommendations. The insidious nature of nativism permits one to wander
into the labyrinth of unsubstantiated hearsay, immigrant stereotype, and
mischaracterization from which there is neither a clear path toward accurate
facts nor clear avenue of exit or retreat from idle supposition. The Kefauver
Committee orchestrated its nativist passion play carefully, casting its
production with characters certain to convince their audience of the foreign
danger poised to subvert its native American way of life. Given nativism's
notable pedigree in American culture, the Committee simply gave it its
newest form and broadest forum.
What makes the Kefauver Committee's nativism so remarkable and so
dangerous was that it was televised live. What is so remarkable and
dangerous about this is television's pervasiveness and immediacy. Never
before had nativism reached so broad an audience so easily, so intimately,
so immediately. The problem of organized crime was identified as the
progeny of a sinister conspiracy of foreign origin. In traveling that extra
mile to Mafia control, the Kefauver Committee allowed their nativist urges
and the opportunity for political theater to get the best of them.
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The times conspired to permit this nativist passion play to be staged.
The Committee's conclusions strummed the consonant chords of our
culture's conceit. Americans were eager to believe their culture had not
spawned organized crime. The times solicited such subterfuge. The times
permitted the shaky conclusion that organized crime was controlled by a
sinister conspiracy of foreign origin. It was a time when denials became
confirmations, suspicions became facts, and hearsay won the day. 22

222. When referring to witnesses suspected of Mafia membership the Committee found,
"[tihey were virtually unanimous in their complete ignorance of the existence of such a group
.... Yet their very denials had a hollow ring." SECOND REPORT, supra note 8, at 11.
Later the Committee concludes the Mafia adheres to the various groups because "[aill this
is too coincidental to be merely accidental." SECOND REPORT, supra note 8, at 11.

